Nuclear Non-Proliferation Issue
The
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a treaty to limit the spread
of nuclear weapons. The vast majority of sovereign states (189) are
parties to the treaty. The parties to the treaty decided by consensus to
extend the treaty indefinitely and without conditions. However, not all
nuclear powers (those states that have openly tested nuclear weapons)
have ratified the treaty. In addition, one possible nuclear power has
not ratified the treaty, and one self-proclaimed nuclear power has
withdrawn from the NPT.
The treaty has three main pillars:
First pillar: Non-proliferation – Five states are permitted by the NPT to own nuclear weapons: China, France, Russia (originally the Soviet Union), United Kingdom, and the United States. These were the only states possessing such weapons at the time the treaty was opened to signature, and are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. These five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) agree not to transfer technology for “nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” to other states, and non-NWS parties agree not to seek or develop nuclear weapons.
Second pillar: Disarmament – The treaty calls for NWS to reduce and liquidate their stockpiles, “...general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” The NWS declare not to “induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to ... acquire nuclear weapons.” A preemptive-strike doctrine and otherwise threatening postures can be viewed as induction by non-NWS parties. The NPT states that any state can withdraw from the treaty if they feel that “extraordinary events” (for example a perceived threat) force them to do so.
Third pillar: The right to peacefully use nuclear technology – Since very few states are willing to completely abandon possession of nuclear fuel for use in energy generation, the third pillar of the NPT provides states with the possibility to develop and use nuclear power, but under conditions intended to make it difficult to develop nuclear weapons. For some states, this third pillar of the NPT (which allows uranium enrichment for fuel reasons) seems to be a major loophole. The treaty gives every state the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and as the commercially popular light water reactor nuclear power station designs use enriched uranium fuel. It follows that states must be allowed to enrich uranium or purchase it on an international market. Peaceful uranium enrichment can arguably be considered a small step away from developing nuclear warheads, and this can be done by withdrawing from the NPT. No state is known to have successfully constructed a nuclear weapon in secret while subjected to NPT inspection.
The question before the conference is: Should nations that are not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty be held to the same standards of the signatories and face automatic economic and political sanctions enforced by the United Nations?
The treaty has three main pillars:
First pillar: Non-proliferation – Five states are permitted by the NPT to own nuclear weapons: China, France, Russia (originally the Soviet Union), United Kingdom, and the United States. These were the only states possessing such weapons at the time the treaty was opened to signature, and are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. These five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) agree not to transfer technology for “nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” to other states, and non-NWS parties agree not to seek or develop nuclear weapons.
Second pillar: Disarmament – The treaty calls for NWS to reduce and liquidate their stockpiles, “...general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” The NWS declare not to “induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to ... acquire nuclear weapons.” A preemptive-strike doctrine and otherwise threatening postures can be viewed as induction by non-NWS parties. The NPT states that any state can withdraw from the treaty if they feel that “extraordinary events” (for example a perceived threat) force them to do so.
Third pillar: The right to peacefully use nuclear technology – Since very few states are willing to completely abandon possession of nuclear fuel for use in energy generation, the third pillar of the NPT provides states with the possibility to develop and use nuclear power, but under conditions intended to make it difficult to develop nuclear weapons. For some states, this third pillar of the NPT (which allows uranium enrichment for fuel reasons) seems to be a major loophole. The treaty gives every state the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and as the commercially popular light water reactor nuclear power station designs use enriched uranium fuel. It follows that states must be allowed to enrich uranium or purchase it on an international market. Peaceful uranium enrichment can arguably be considered a small step away from developing nuclear warheads, and this can be done by withdrawing from the NPT. No state is known to have successfully constructed a nuclear weapon in secret while subjected to NPT inspection.
The question before the conference is: Should nations that are not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty be held to the same standards of the signatories and face automatic economic and political sanctions enforced by the United Nations?
